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Quantum Key Distribution is a practically implementable information-theoretic secure
method for transmitting keys to remote partners performing quantum communication.
After examining various protocols from the simplest such as QC and BB84 we move on to
describe BBM92, DPSK, SARG04 and finally MDI from the largest possible communica-
tion distance and highest secret key bitrate. We discuss how any protocol can be optimized
by reviewing the various steps and underlying assumptions proper to every protocol with
the corresponding consequence in each case.
Quantum communication uses QKD for transmitting secret keys between remote part-
ners allowing them to encrypt and decrypt their messages over unsecure transmission channels.
QKD has been introduced by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 1 and its most attractive feature, after
a number of developments, resulted in its actual deployability. It has already been commercially
implemented by a number of quantum communication (QC) companies such as SeQureNet in
France, ID Quantique in Switzerland, MagiQ Technologies in the USA and QuintessenceLabs
in Australia. Moreover QKD straightforwardly allows detectability of online eavesdroppers.
Nevertheless a difficulty arises in QKD when it is engineered with actual fiber optic commu-
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nication devices. A number of weak points emerge leading to several types of security breach
and consequently rendering it prone to a variety of attacks. Those are named after each weak
point exploited such as detector blinding 2, 3, detector dead-time 4, device calibration 5, laser
damage 6, time-shift 7, 8, phase-remapping 9...
Collectively some of these attacks are qualified as side-channel since they exploit dis-
crepancies between theoretical and experimental implementation of QKD. While practical im-
plementation challenges is reviewed by Diamanti et al. 10 who mention a number of issues
for better tackling possible drawbacks and loopholes when moving from theory to experimen-
tation, several methods 11 already exist and have been developed for continually improving
QKD security. One efficient protection from these attacks pioneered by Braunstein et al. 11
suggest introducing virtual channels leading to inaccessible private spaces where detectors and
processing tools are placed.
The goal of this work is about optimization of several fiber optic transmission protocols
such as QC, BB84, BBM92, DPSK, SARG04 12 and its MDI-QKD version designed to fend off
photon number splitting (PNS) attacks by considering important factors such as error correction
functions, detector dark counting parameter and quantum efficiency.
Optimization is about increasing secret key bitrate and communication distance and involves in
general the mean photon number used during transmission or some other parameters depend-
ing on the protocol employed. One such example is the entangling parameter χ used in the
BBM92 13, 14 protocol.
Presently, there exists three versions of QKD: discrete variable QKD (DV-QKD), continu-
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ous variable QKD (CV-QKD) and distributed-phase-reference QKD (DPR-QKD). In DV-QKD
particle-like (photon) properties of light are exploitedwhereas in CV-QKD, wave-like properties
of light are used. In both cases, a pulse or wavefunction corresponds to a communication bit or
symbol whereas in DPR-QKD the latter are encoded with several (e.g. consecutive) pulses. On
the reception side, DV-QKD employs photon detectors and counters whereas CV-QKD employs
homodyne or heterodyne detection techniques as in traditional telecommunication demodula-
tion. DPR-QKD uses single-photon detectors similarly to DV-QKD, as well as planar lightwave
circuit technology interferometers.
It is important to point that several workers such as Zhou et al. 15 found that when
communication resources are finite, MDI-QKD secret key rates are typically lower than that of
standard decoy-state QKD. Nevertheless, a number of methods exist to circumvent this prob-
lem, such as proper basis choice along with intensity selection algorithms 15 in order to achieve
longer distances.
In this work several protocols belonging to either DV-QKD or DPR-QKD are optimized
and compared on the basis of five distinct sets of experiments 16 run at different locations: BT8,
BT13 (British Telecom setups at different operating wavelengths), G13 (Geneva group), KTH15
(Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm) and Japanese Telecom NTT company (Red, Green
and Blue sets). The appropriate parameters are given in Table 1 and Table 2.
1 General protocol considerations
Alice and Bob use two channels to communicate: one quantum and private to send polarized
single photons and another one classical and public (telephone or Internet) to send ordinary
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messages 17. As an illustration we consider the BB84 protocol where Alice selects two bases
in 2D Hilbert space consisting each of two orthogonal states:
⊕
basis with (0, pi/2) linearly
polarized photons, and
⊗
basis with (pi/4,−pi/4) linearly polarized photons.
A message transmitted by Alice to Bob over the Quantum channel is a stream of symbols se-
lected randomly among the four above and Alice and Bob choose randomly one of the two
bases
⊕
or
⊗
to perform photon polarization measurement.
Alice and Bob announce their respective choice of bases over the public channel without re-
vealing any measurement results.
The raw key is obtained by a process called ”sifting” consisting of retaining only the results
obtained when the bases used for measurement are same.
After key sifting, another process called key distillation 12 must be performed. This process
entails three steps 18: error correction, privacy amplification and authentication in order to
counter any information leakage from photon interception, eavesdropping detection (with the
no-cloning theorem 12) and exploitation of information announced over the public channel.
Error correction is also called Information reconciliation and can be performed with two proce-
dures: one possibility is to correct the errors using parity coding while the other discards errors
by locating error-free subsections of the sifted key. Information reconciliation can be further
divided into two classes: one uses solely unidirectional information flow from Alice to Bob,
while the second uses an interactive protocol with bidirectional information flow.
For instance, the error correction function given by Enzer et al. 19 as: fe(x) = 1.1581 +
57.200x3 with x the error has been determined experimentally by Brassard et al. 20 and orig-
inates from the CASCADE error correction algorithm. CASCADE is highly efficient because
it is based on an interactive bidirectional information flow between Alice and Bob. fe(x) value
depends on the various error correction algorithms used, and is typically between 1 and about
1.5. When fe(x) = 1, the ideal limiting case is reached where the number of error correction
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bits is equal to the Shannon limit. In some cases the value of the function is fixed to some
convenient value such as 1.33. Other algorithms have been developed by Lutkenhaus 21 and
Zbinden et al. 22 as seen further below.
Privacy amplification is based on randomness extraction allowing to draw from an arbitrary
random source consisting of a bit sequence arbitrarily distributed a sub-sequence that has an
almost uniform distribution 17. Mathematically it is described by the notion of Smooth entropy
that is a measure for the number of almost uniform random bits.
Quantum communications based on transmitting photons across fiber optics must be able to
detect accurately proper signal carrying photons and not ”dark photons” originating from noise
and intermediate devices during propagation. Thus detector dark counting must be substantially
reduced in order to avoid false detection events whereas quantum yield must be increased in or-
der to enhance signal detection quality...
As a consequence, a number of issues should be addressed at the different processing steps
such as photon states, bases, encoding of quantum data, determination of mean photon number,
transmission handling, error detection and correction algorithms...
The secret key bit rate as a function of distance L accounting for privacy amplification PA(L)
and error correction EC(L) is given asymptotically by:
K(L) = PA(L) + EC(L) = Q[1− h2(eb)]−Qµfe(Eµ)h2(Eµ) (1)
whereQ is the signal gain, eb the bit error, Qµ and Eµ total gain and quantum bit error rate for a
given mean photon number µ. The first term is due to privacy amplification whereas the second
stems from error correction typically based on function fe(x) and h2(x) = −x log2(x) − (1 −
x) log2(1− x) the binary Shannon entropy.
In the following protocols, we discuss how the previous issues are dealt with.
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2 Simplest protocol
In the simplest protocol case, with no consideration of privacy amplification and accounting
for error correction in a rudimentary way, the transmittance versus distance L is given by ηt =
10−αL/10 where α is the wavelength dependent transmission loss along the optic fiber.
The probability of photon detection after traveling a distance L is psignal = µηtη where η
is the receiver or detector quantum yield.
µ is optimized versus distance in order to yield the largest secret key rate or may be
considered as constant regardless of traveling distance.
The probability of dark photon detection is pdark and the probability of false detection of
a photon is pnoise = (1− ηtη)pdark.
The Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER) is given by QB =
pnoise
(psignal+pnoise)
and displayed
in fig. 10. The resulting secret key rate without accounting for pulse frequency is given by:
K(L) = (psignal + pnoise)(1. − QB/Qt) where Qt is a threshold QBER value. Using the
parameters µ = 0.1 and Qt = 0.01, 0.02, 0.04, 0.08 the results are displayed in fig. 10. In
general the QBER depends on several parameters such as channel depolarization (considered
as White noise) as well as other types of noise and dark count rate as described next. Error
correction algorithms employed to reduce the QBER (seeMethods) should be tailored to combat
specifically these effects.
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3 QC protocol
This protocol 22 is a slightly more sophisticated version of the previous protocol. Taking account
of receiver loss one estimates error correction, privacy amplification effects as a function of
QBER 20 and the secret key bitrate is estimated in a simple probabilistic manner, in contrast with
the ensuing protocols that we consider in this work. The transmittance versus distanceL is given
by ηt = 10
−(αL+Lc)/10 where Lc is receiver loss. After traveling distance L, the probability of
photon detection is psignal = µηtη with η the receiver quantum yield. Considering pdark, pnoise
as respectively the probabilities of dark counting, and false detection of a photon, we deduce the
QBER from 22 the ratio of false probability detection to total detection,QB =
(pnoisepsignal+pdark)
(psignal+nDpdark)
where nD is the number of detectors. This is a more elaborate definition than the previous simple
expression QB =
pnoise
(psignal+pnoise)
since it accounts for noise and dark counting processes.
In order to evaluate the secret key bitrate, two operations are performed: error correction and
privacy amplification that are given approximately 22 by EC(L) = 7QB/2−QB log2(QB) and
PA(L) = 1 + log2[(1 + 4QB − 4Q2B)/2] respectively. Note that the resulting secret key rate
given by: K(L) = QBηtµη(1 − EC(L))(1 − PA(L)) and displayed for all experiments in
fig. 10 is not of the Shannon asymptotic form (see eq. 1).
4 BB84 protocol
This protocol is based on four states originating from four photon polarizations: |→〉 , |↑〉 , |ր〉 , |ց〉
that are used to transmit quantum data with |ր〉 = 1√
2
(|→〉+ |↑〉) and |ց〉 = 1√
2
(|→〉 − |↑〉).
A message transmitted by Alice to Bob over the Quantum channel is a stream of symbols
selected randomly among the four above and Alice and Bob choose randomly one of the two
bases
⊕
or
⊗
to perform photon polarization measurement. We consider below two possi-
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ble sources: the non-entangled Weak Coherent Pulse (WCP) and the entangled Spontaneous
Parametric Down Conversion (SPDC) source.
In order to evaluate the effect of the photon pulse nature on BB84 secret key bitrate we
start with the WCP case. The latter are photon states with a mean photon number µ that should
be low in order to approximate single photon states. The probability that one finds n photons
in a coherent state follows Poisson statistics (see Methods section): Pµ(n) = e
−µ µn
n!
with µ the
average photon number. The probability to have at least one photon is: 1 − Pµ(0) = 1 − e−µ.
Consequently, the probability to have at least a single count detected by Bob is: psingle =
1 − e−µηtη ≈ µηtη ≡ psignal where µ has been replaced by µηtη, with ηt the optical fiber
transmission and η the receiver detection efficiency. The secret key bit rate (before sifting, error
correction and privacy amplification) accounting for pulse frequency ν is given by: νK(L) =
νpsignal ≈ νµηtη. The results for the bitrate versus distance for the four telecom company
experiments are displayed in fig. 10.
The effect of entanglement on BB84 secret key bitrate is treated by considering an SPDC
source (see Methods section). Entanglement increases robustness with respect to PNS attacks.
The results for the bitrate versus distance for the four telecom company experiments are dis-
played in fig. 10.
5 BBM92 protocol
The BBM92 23 protocol is a two-photon variant of BB84 drawing advantage from BB84 pro-
tocol based on a SPDC source providing entanglement as in the previous section. Thus Alice
and Bob each share a photon of an entangled photon pair, for which they measure the polar-
ization state in a randomly chosen basis out of two non-orthogonal bases. There is no analog
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to a photon-number splitting attack in BBM92 and since it is an entanglement-based protocol,
expectations indicate it should be more robust than BB84. Moreover it is less vulnerable to er-
rors caused by dark counts, since one dark count alone cannot produce an error in this protocol.
The expressions for the probability of a true coincidence, ptrue, and the probability of a false
coincidence, pfalse, are different for an ideally-entangled photon source and a SPDC-entangled
photon source. The secret key bitrate is displayed in fig. 10 for three different sources: Arbi-
trary, ideal and SPDC. The major parameters 13, 14 are pdark the dark counting probability equal
to nDdB where nD is the number of detectors and dB the dark count rate and χ controlling
entanglement through SPDC. χ and the mean photon number µ should both be optimized in
order to achieve the best secret key bitrate.
6 DPSK protocol
This is the quantum version of the classical Differential Phase Shift Keying 24 protocol based
on coding binary information with phase difference of successive symbols (fixed length bit
sequences) instead of coding information with absolute phase of individual symbols (as in PSK
modulation). Similarly to BB84, DPSK uses four nonorthogonal states 25. A photon originating
from a single-photon source takes three different paths, the time delays between them being
same, using beam splitters or optical switches. Alice randomly modulates by [0, ±pi] the phase
of the photon retrieved from different routes and sends it to Bob.
Bob measures the phase difference of each consecutive pulse with a 1-bit delay interfer-
ometer. Two detectors D1 and D2 are placed at the interferometer output ports. D1 clicks when
the phase difference is 0 whereas D2 clicks when the phase difference is ±pi. The average pho-
ton number per pulse being less than 1, Bob observes clicks occasionally and at random times.
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Bob informs Alice of the time instances at which he observes clicks, thus no bit information
is leaked to the intruder. Alice is able to identify, from her modulation data, the detector that
clicked at Bob location. Transforming D1 and D2 clicks into 0 and 1, Alice and Bob are able to
extract an identical bit string.
Eve cannot obtain bit information perfectly from a photon intercepted with beam splitting.
In this type of attack, Eve taps one photon out of multiple photons in a coherent pulse and then
obtains bit information by measuring the photon after Alice and Bob exchange supplementary
information through a public channel. In conventional BB84, Eve can measure bit information
perfectly from a tapped photon. Eve cannot do so in the present scheme, because she cannot
measure one of the two phase differences with 100% probability.
For this protocol, we have three sets of results, two for the four European Telecom com-
pany experiments BT13, BT8, G13 and KTH15 displayed in fig. 10 and one for the Japanese
Telecom company NTT (called Red, Green, Blue) set of experiments displayed in fig. 10. The
experiments differ not only by the parameters as displayed in table 1 and table 2 but also from
the algorithms used for evaluating the secret key rate (see Methods section). The parameters
are given in table 2.
7 SARG04 protocol
SARG04 protocol has been developed to combat PNS attacks that are targeted toward inter-
cepting photons present in weak coherent pulses (WCP) that are used for communication. This
stems from the fact, it is not possible presently to commercially exploit single photons in a
pulse. However, progress in developing large scale methods targeted at using single photons
in a pulse is advancing steadily. PNS attacks can be strongly reduced by the decoy method
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consisting of using states with slightly different intensities than the signal and will be employed
in this protocol to further strengthen it. SARG04 being very similar to BB84 12 protocol, the
simplest example of secret key sharing among sender and receiver (Alice and Bob), we review
first the BB84 case below. Alice prepares many pairs of qubits and sends each one of them to
Bob after performing a random rotation over different axes with TlR
k where l ∈ {0, 1, 2} and
k ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}.
Upon receiving the qubits, Bob first applies:
• A random reverse multi-axis rotation R−k′T−1l′ ,
• Afterwards, he performs a local filtering operation in order to retrieve one of the maxi-
mally entangled EPR Bell 26, 27 states (see Methods section).
• After, Alice and Bob compare their indices k, l and k′, l′ via public communication, and
keep the qubit pairs with k = k′ and l = l′ when Bob’s filtering operation is successful.
• They choose some states randomly as test bits, measure them in the Z basis, and compare
their results publicly to estimate the bit error rate and the information acquired by the
eavesdropper.
• Finally, they utilize the corresponding Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) code 28 to correct
bit and phase errors and perform a final measurement in the Z basis on their qubits to
obtain the secret key.
The secure key rate with infinite decoy states 29 using one and two photon source contributions,
is given by:
K(L) = Q0 +
n=2∑
n=1
Qn[1−H(epn|ebn)]−Qµfe(Eµ)h2(Eµ) (2)
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where Qn is the gain of the n-photon signal states which can be estimated from the decoy-state
method; epn , ebn are phase and bit error for the n-photon state; Qµ and Eµ are total gain and
quantum bit error rate for a given mean photon number µ. The conditional Shannon entropy
H(epn|ebn) depends on phase and bit errors as well as on the probability a that bit flip and phase
shift occur (see Methods section). Comparison of the secret key rate versus distance for the
four-state and six-state SARG04 protocol using GYS 30 η = 0.045, eD = 0.033, pdark = 10
−6
and Tang et al. 31 η = 0.43, eD = 0.005, pdark = 10
−7 parameters is displayed in fig. 10. The
results show clearly that Tang et al. results are compatible with present experimental values
that travel beyond 200 kms whereas the GYS results are limited to distances below 150 kms.
8 MDI version of the SARG04 protocol
Following Lo et al. 32 Mizutani et al. 33 modified the original SARG04 protocol by in-
cluding an intermediate experimental setup run by Charlie, at mid-distance between Alice and
Bob, consisting of Bell correlation measurements. The setup contains a half beam-splitter, two
polarization beam-splitters to simulate photonic Hadamard and CNOT gates in order to produce
Bell states, as well as photodiode detectors. This additional step will help discard non perfectly
anti-correlated photons and thus reduce transmission error rates. In addition, Alice and Bob
not only choose photon polarization randomly, they also use WCP amplitude modulation to
generate decoy states in order to confuse the eavesdropper.
The protocol runs as follows:
• Charlie performs Bell measurement on the incoming photon pulses and announces to
Alice and Bob over the public channel whether his measurement outcome is successful
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or not. When the outcome is successful, he announces the successful events as being of
Type1 or Type2. Type1 is coincidence detection events of AT and BR or BT and AR.
Type2 is coincidence detection events of AT and AR or BT and BR where AT,BT
stand for detecting transmitted (T ) photon events from Alice (A) or Bob (B) linearly
polarized at 45◦ whereas AR,BR are for detecting reflected (R) photon events at -45◦ .
• Alice and Bob broadcast k and k′, over the public channel. If the measurement outcome is
successful with Type1 and k = k′ = 0, . . . , 3, they keep their initial bit values, and Alice
flips her bit. If the measurement outcome is successful with Type2 and k = k′ = 0, 2,
they keep their initial bit values. In all the other cases, they discard their bit values.
• After repeating the above operations several times, Alice and Bob perform error correc-
tion, privacy amplification and authentication as described previously.
In the ideal case (no transmission errors, no eavesdropping) Alice and Bob should discard results
pertaining to measurements done in different bases (or when Bob failed to detect any photon). In
QKD, Alice and Bob should be able to determine efficiently their shared secret key as a function
of distance L separating them. Since, the secure key is determined after sifting and distillation,
secure key rate is expressed in bps (bits per signal) given that Alice sends symbols to Bob
to sift and distill with the remaining bits making the secret key. For Type i event, we define
e
(m,n)
i,p as the phase error probability that Alice and Bob emitsm and n photons respectively, and
Charlie announces a successful outcome with Q
(m,n)
i , the joint probability. Consequently the
asymptotic key rate for Type i is given as a sum over partial private amplification terms of the
form Q
(m,n)
i [1 − h2(e(m,n)i,p )] and one error correction term Qtoti fe(etoti )h2(etoti ) related to total
errors as 33, 34:
Ki(L) =
2∑
m,n=1
Q
(m,n)
i [1− h2(e(m,n)i,p )]−Qtoti fe(etoti )h2(etoti ). (3)
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where the highest index Q
(2,2)
i gain term is omitted. The total probabilities Q
tot
i =∑
m,nQ
(m,n)
i and total error rates are given by e
tot
i =
∑
m,nQ
(m,n)
i e
(m,n)
i,b /Q
tot
i where e
(m,n)
i,b is
the ”Type i” bit error probability and h2 is the binary Shannon entropy
24. Moreover, the above
asymptotic key rate is obtained in the limit of infinite number of decoy states 33 (see Methods).
We should stress that this method differs from Ma et al. 35 who used a special sifting
technique to handle single-photon detector dead-time constraints without considering Type 1
and 2 bit error probabilities depending on photon emission.
Since Charlie is in the middle between Alice and Bob, the channel transmittance to Char-
lie from Alice is the same as that from Bob. Considering that L is the distance between Al-
ice and Bob, the channel transmittance ηT is obtained by replacing L by L/2 resulting in:
ηT = 10
−αL/20. For the standard Telecom wavelength 24 λ = 1.55µm, the loss coefficient with
distance is α=0.21 dB/km. The quantum efficiency and the DCR of the detectors are taken as
η = 0.045 and d = 8.5× 10−7, respectively as in the GYS 30 case. In fig 10 secret key rates for
Type 1 and Type 2 events are displayed versus distance for two classes of parameters: GYS 30
and Tang et al. 31 parameters with freely varying error correction function fe, α = 0.12 and
mean number of photons µ optimized versus distance.
9 Discussion
Communication distances and secret key bitrates obtained in this work can be improved when
we vary the error correction function, DCR and quantum efficiency of the detectors. Our results
show that the most sensitiveway to increase communication distance substantially is to decrease
the DCR. The least sensitive parameter is the error correction function choice and in spite of
exaggerating the values of the quantum efficiency in order to probe the largest possible range
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of communication distances, the DCR parameter is the most promising, consequently future
research efforts ought to be directed towards reducing it considerably. This improvement relies
on developing special algorithms that will allow to discriminate between different events oc-
curring around the photodetectors, developing materials with selective specially tailored higher
thresholds preventing false ”clicks” triggered by ”irrelevant” events or using ultralow loss opti-
cal fibers that will preserve the signal over longer distances as has been used recently by Yin et
al. 36 who managed to attain 404 kms with MDI-QKD.
10 Methods
Weak Coherent pulse source Coding a sequence of n symbols s1, ..., sn entails taking the
tensor product resulting in the total wavefunction |Ψ〉 = |ψ(s1)〉 ⊗ ... ⊗ |ψ(sn)〉 where each
individual wavefunction |ψ(si)〉 corresponds to a symbol si.
The quantum state |ψ〉 emitted by a laser is a coherent state depending on a complex value
α =
√
µeiθ with
√
µ the intensity corresponding to an average number of photons µ per pulse
and θ the phase. In photon number n space (also called Fock space), the symbol wavefunction
is given by:
|ψ〉 = e− |α|
2
2
∞∑
n=0
αn√
n!
|n〉 . (4)
The probability that n photons are in the coherent state is given by:
p(n) = |〈n|ψ〉|2 = e−|α|2 |α|
2n
n!
, (5)
recovering the above cited Poissonian result p(n) ≡ Pµ(n) = e−µ µnn! with average photon num-
ber 〈n〉 = µ = |α|2. Poisson distribution indicates that photons are statistically independent. A
single-photon source is aproximated by taking a weak intensity µ such that the probability of
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emitting a two-photon state is small.
Distributed-Phase-Reference source Alice produces a sequence of coherent states of
same intensity resulting in |Ψ〉 = ... ∣∣eiθk−1√µ〉 ∣∣eiθk√µ〉 ∣∣eiθk+1√µ〉 ... where each phase θ
can be 0 or pi. Bits are coded in the difference between two successive phases with value 0 if
eiθk = eiθk+1 and 1 otherwise. This contrasts with the WCP case where a bit or a symbol is
related to a single coherent state.
Spontaneous Parametric Down Conversion (SPDC) source Entanglement of photon
pairs is produced by conversion of some photons from a pump laser beam after interacting with
a non-linear crystal like KNbO3, LiNbO3...
In the approximation of two output modes, the state can be written as 13
|Ψ〉 = 1
coshχ
∞∑
n=0
(tanhχ)n |nA, nB〉 , (6)
where χ is proportional to the second-order dielectric susceptibility χ(2), pump amplitude and
interaction time. |nA, nB〉 denotes the state with nA photons in the mode pertaining to Alice
and nB photons in the mode proper to Bob.
Optimization Several protocols require optimization 37 techniques in order to extract the
secret key bitrate. Optimization entails varying the mean photon number µ or the entanglement
parameter χ until we obtain the largest key bitrate for the longest communication distance. We
have used several minimization techniques based on Linear Optimization methods such as the
Simplex method in the linear case, whereas a combination of Golden section, Brent or Broy-
den 38 techniques were used in the non-linear cases 37.
Rotation operations In the basic four-state SARG04 protocol which is similar to BB84 a num-
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ber of steps are added to improve it and protect it against PNS attacks. The steps entail introduc-
ing random rotation and filtering of the quantum states. Rotation operators 39 use Pauli matrices
σX , σY , σZ : R = cos(
pi
4
)I − i sin(pi
4
)σY is a pi/2 rotation operator about Y axis,T0 = I is the
(2×2) identity operator, T1 = cos(pi4 )I − i sin(pi4 ) (σZ+σX )√2 is a pi/2 rotation operator around the
(Z +X) axis, T2 = cos(
pi
4
)I − i sin(pi
4
) (σZ−σX )√
2
is a pi/2 rotation operator around the (Z −X)
axis.
State encoding In the four-state SARG04 QKD protocol, there are four linearly polarized
states to encode quantum data: |→〉 , |↑〉 , |ր〉 , |ց〉 with: |ր〉 = 1√
2
(|→〉 + |↑〉) and |ց〉 =
1√
2
(|→〉 − |↑〉).
In the six-state SARG04 QKD protocol, there are six polarization states to transmit quantum
data,
four linearly polarized |→〉, |↑〉, |ր〉, |ց〉, and two circularly polarized |〉 = 1√
2
(|→〉+ i |↑〉),
and |	〉 = 1√
2
(|→〉 − i |↑〉).
The states are arranged into twelve sets with each set member corresponding respectively to ei-
ther 0 or 1 binary {|→〉 , |ց〉}, {|ց〉 , |↑〉}, {|↑〉 , |ր〉}, {|ր〉 , |→〉}, {|→〉 , |〉}, {|〉 , |↑〉},
{|↑〉 , |	〉}, {|	〉 , |→〉}, {|〉 , |ց〉}, {|ց〉 , |	〉}, {|	〉 , |ր〉}, {|ր〉 , |〉}.
Decoy states are described by yields Yn and gains Qn of n-photon states such that:
Qn = e
−µµ
n
n!
Yn, Qµ = e
−µ
∞∑
n=0
µn
n!
Yn, Eµ =
1
Qµ
e−µ
∞∑
n=0
µn
n!
Ynebn (7)
where total gain Qµ and total quantum error Eµ are given by the weighted average of their
corresponding n-photon state contributions. For the four-state SARG04 protocol, the Yn and
ebn is given by
39
Yn =
1
2
[ηn(ed +
1
2
) + (1− ηn)pdark], ebn =
ηned +
1
2
(1− ηn)pdark
2Yn
. (8)
whereas in the six-state SARG04 protocol, the Yn and ebn is given by
39
Yn =
1
3
[ηn(ed +
1
2
) + (1− ηn)pdark], ebn =
ηned +
1
2
(1− ηn)pdark
3Yn
(9)
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with ηn = 1− (1− η)n where η = ηd10−αL/10 and L is the transmission length.
Multiphoton statesWorking with ν-photon states amounts to prepare pairs of qubits are in the
state:∣∣ψ(ν)〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉A |φ0〉⊗νB +|1〉A |φ1〉⊗νB ), whereA,B denote Alice and Bob and |φ0〉 = cos(pi8 ) |0x〉+
sin(pi
8
) |1x〉, |φ1〉 = cos(pi8 ) |0x〉 − sin(pi8 ) |1x〉.
Depolarizing quantum channel The QBER or ratio of the number of wrong bits to the total
number of bits in the sifted key, is strongly affected by channel depolarization 40 characterized
by a single parameter D called ”disturbance”. D is the probability of receiving a wrong bit
after transmission through channel 41. In the BB84 protocol, a sifted key bit is generated when
Alice and Bob choose the same basis and consequently the wrong bit in the sifted key depends
on D. The probabilities of obtaining the wrong and right bit in the BB84 protocol are given by
pw = D and pr = 1 − D, respectively and the QBER= pwpr+pw = D. In the SARG04 protocol,
the probability of receiving the wrong bit is pw = D whereas for the right bit, it is
41 pr =
1
2
.
Thus the QBER= D1
2
+D
.
Filtering A local filtering operation is defined by F = sin(pi
8
) |0x〉 〈0x|+cos(pi8 ) |1x〉 〈1x| where
{|0x〉 , |1x〉} are X-eigenstate qubits; they are also eigenvectors of σX with eigenvalues +1,
and -1 respectively. |0x〉 = 1√2(|0〉 + |1〉), |1x〉 = 1√2(− |0〉 + |1〉). |0〉 , |1〉 are σZ eigen-
vectors
(
1
0
)
and
(
0
1
)
expressed in the Z basis with eigenvalues +1, and -1 respectively. Lo-
cal filtering enhances entanglement degree and the pi
8
angle helps retrieve 42 one of the maxi-
mally entangled EPR Bell 26, 27 states i.e. polarization entangled photon pair states given by:
|ψ±〉 = 1√
2
(|→↑〉 ± |↑→〉), |φ±〉 = 1√
2
(|→→〉 ± |↑↑〉). They form a complete orthonormal
basis in 4D Hilbert space for all polarization states of a two-photon system and the advantage
of local filtering is to make Alice and Bob share pairs of a Bell state making the shared bits
unconditionally secure 42.
Asymptotic Entropy In the presence of bit and phase errors, the asymptotic conditional entropy
18
is given by39:
H(ep|eb) = −(1 + a− eb − ep) log2(1+a−eb−ep1−eb )− (ep − a) log2(
ep−a
1−eb )
−(eb − a) log2( eb−aeb )− a log2(
a
eb
) (10)
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Experiment λ (nm) α (dB/km) Lc (dB) e0 dB η
BT8 830 2.5 8 0.01 5. ×10−8 0.5
BT13 1300 0.38 5 8. ×10−3 1. ×10−5 0.11
G13 1300 0.32 3.2 1.4 ×10−3 8.2 ×10−5 0.17
KTH15 1550 0.2 1 0.01 2. ×10−4 0.18
Table 1: Fiber attenuation α in dB/km, receiver loss Lc in dB, e0 innocent bitrate, dark
count parameter dB and quantum yield η in the British Telecom experiments BT8 and
BT13, Geneva G13 and Sweden KTH15.
Experiment α (dB/km) Lc (dB) dB e0 η
NTT-Red 0.2 2 1.95 ×10−5 0.088 0.03
NTT-Green 0.2 1 1. ×10−6 0.02 0.03
NTT-Blue 0.2 1. 1. ×10−6 0.07 0.03
Table 2: fiber attenuation α in dB/km, receiver loss Lc in dB, dark count parameter dB,
detector quantum efficiency η and e0 innocent bitrate, for the Japanese NTT Telecom
company Red, Green and Blue sets.
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Figure 1 (Color on-line) QBER versus distance for the simplest protocol. The pa-
rameters are: α = 0.2, η = 0.25, pdark = 10
−4 and µ = 0.1.
Figure 2 (Color on-line) Rates versus distance for the simplest protocol with different
threshold QBER values Qt. The parameters are: α = 0.2, η = 0.25, pdark = 10
−4 and
µ = 0.1.
Figure 3 (Color on-line) QC protocol comparison in the four Telecom company ex-
periments: BT13, BT8, G13 and KTH15. µ is optimized with distance. The number of
detectors is assumed to be nD = 2.
Figure 4 (Color on-line) WCP source use for the BB84 protocol in the four Tele-
com company experiments: BT13, BT8, G13 and KTH15. The algorithm used is by
Lu¨tkenhaus in ref. 16. µ is optimized with distance.
Figure 5 (Color on-line) SPDC source use for the BB84 protocol in the four Tele-
com company experiments: BT13, BT8, G13 and KTH15. The algorithm used is by
Lu¨tkenhaus in ref. 16. µ is optimized with distance.
Figure 6 (Color on-line) BBM92 protocol in the arbitrary, ideal and SPDC entangled
source case. The algorithm used is by Waks et al. in ref. 13,14. In the arbitrary case,
µ = 0.3× 10(−0.7αL/10.) and the dark counting parameter dB = 5 × 10−5, whereas in the
ideal case µ = 1. The SPDC entanglement parameter χ = 0.1.
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Figure 7 (Color on-line) DPSK results for the BT13, BT8, G13 and KTH15 Telecom
company experiments. The algorithm employed is by Takesue et al. 43. µ is optimized
with distance.
Figure 8 (Color on-line) DPSK results for the Japanese NTT Telecom company sets
of experiments. µ is optimized with distance.
Figure 9 (Color on-line) Comparison of secret key rates for the 4-state and 6-state
SARG04 protocol using GYS 30 and Tang et al. 31 parameters. For all curves α = 0.21
and µ = 0.1. Note an improvement from GYS to Tang et al. experiments by roughly a
factor 10 in η, eD, pdark parameters resulted in a gain of 100 kms.
Figure 10 (Color on-line) MDI-QKD SARG04 key rate K(L) for Type 1 and Type 2
events, in bps versus distance L using GYS 30 and Tang et al. 31 parameters. α = 0.21,
variable error correction function is used and µ is optimized with distance. Note again
the 100 kms gain in moving from GYS to Tang et al. parameters.
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